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FAMILY PROTECTION UNDER THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
By L. WILLIAM SCHMMIT, JR.*
The Colorado Legislature recently adopted a modified form
of the Uniform Probate Code to replace the multitude of
statutes previously constituting the probate system. Mr. Schmidt
analyzes present Colorado law protecting the immediate family
of the decedent and discusses what the Uniform Code changes
mean to the practicing attorney. The treatment, analytical
rather than argumentative, provides a realistic appraisal of the
two systems.
INTRODUCTION
T HE probate laws of all states make some provision for the
protection of the immediate family of a decedent. Such
laws are designed not only to protect the immediate family by
giving them preference over general creditors of the decendent
with respect to certain assets, but they are also intended to
protect the family from intentional or unintentional disinheri-
tance by the decedent. The law, of course, must strike some
balance between the need to protect the immediate family and
the desire to protect the creditors of the decedent. The legisla-
ture usually decides that certain assets and certain amounts
of money represent minimum standards which should be sub-
ject to protection in favor of the family. The protection af-
forded may take different forms depending upon whether the
person protected is the spouse of the decedent or one of the
decedent's children. The Uniform Probate Code (Code) recog-
nizes the necessity for protecting the immediate family. In
some cases, the protection afforded is not significantly differ-
ent from that already provided by Colorado law. However, in
*Partner, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1959, University of
Colorado; J.D., 1962, University of Michigan. The author wishes to
acknowledge the valuable assistance of Marilyn M. Rodriguez, senior
student at the University of Denver College of Law, who contributed
in the research and preparation of this article.
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other cases such as the elective share of the surviving spouse,
the changes are quite drastic.
The Colorado Bar Association Study Committee on the Uni-
form Probate Code was appointed to consider the advisability
of adopting the Code in Colorado. After an extensive effort,
a proposed Colorado Probate Code was approved by the Board
of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association. Senate Joint
Resolution No. 7 of the 1972 Colorado General Assembly1
directed the Legislative Council to study the Code and the
effect that its passage would have on Colorado law. Hearings
were conducted with the result that the Colorado Probate Code
was proposed in the 1973 session in the form of House Bill No.
1039. At the time this article is being written, the Colorado
Probate Code has been approved by the House of Representa-
tives and is awaiting hearings in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. Except as otherwise noted, the recommendations of the
Colorado Bar Association Subcommittee on Article II were ap-
proved by the House of Representatives.
I. CURRENT COLORADO FAMILY ALLOWANCE
AND HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
A. The Family Allowance
The present Colorado statutes provide considerable protec-
tion for the immediate family of a decedent. These protections
primarily take the form of the family allowance2 and the
homestead exemption.3 Under the family allowance statute, the
surviving spouse or minor children of a decedent are allowed
to claim $7,500 worth of cash and assets from the estate. The
family allowance has been described by the Colorado Supreme
Court as a temporary measure "designed to help the widow
during the period of administration of her husband's estate.
' '4
Although early Colorado law limited the benefit to widows, the
language of the present statute makes it clear that a surviving
husband is also entitled to claim the allowance from the estate
of his deceased wife.) The allowance is not received auto-
matically. A written application must be filed on or before the
I S.J. Res. 7, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 653.
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16(2) (a) (Supp. 1969).
:3Id. § 77-3-4 (1963).
4 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 598, 246 P.2d 894, 901 (1952).
See also Zackheim v. Zackheim, 75 Colo. 161, 225 P. 268 (1924); Rem-
ington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132, 209 P. 802 (1922); Grover v. Clover,
69 Colo. 72, 169 P. 578 (1917); Deeble v. Alerton, 58 Colo. 166, 143 P.
1096 (1914).
;CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16(2) (a) (Supp. 1969) provides, in
part, that "he or she shall be allowed to have and retain as his or her
sole and separate property . . . ." (emphasis added).
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date fixed in the notice to creditors as the last date for filing
claims." Colorado case law has held that the claim must be
under oath and filed within 6 months after the issuance of
letters of administration.
7
The present Colorado statute does not seem to require
that the claimant of the family allowance be a Colorado resi-
dent. Although earlier cases in this area held that Colorado
residence was a prerequisite to a surviving spouse's or minor
child's right to claim the family allowance," these cases were
decided under earlier versions of the statute which expressly
limited the allowance to a "widow residing in this State."9
Tn 1953 the statute was amended to avoid any reference to resi-
dence within the state, 10 and no subsequent cases on this ques-
tion have been presented.
The $7,500 allowance may be taken in the form of cash,
specific personal property, or any combination of the two.
If specific items of personal property are chosen, the court
may order an appraisal of the estimated value of the selected
property." The allowance was originally designed to give the
widow a right to certain articles of personal property formerly
belonging to her husband "so that she would not be stripped
of the means with which to carry on.' 2 A common practice
today where the estate is solvent is to take the family auto-
mobile, furniture, and personal effects in partial satisfaction
of the amount.
Under the present statutory scheme, the family allowance
-a fourth class claim- takes priority over the claims of the
decedent's general creditors."13 Where there is insufficient per-
sonal property in the estate to provide the entire $7,500, real
property in the estate may be sold. 4 However, the family al-
lowance is not superior to a valid mortgage and only the
equity may be used to satisfy the allowance.' 5 If the estate's
6COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-12(1) (1963).
7 Wigington v. Wigington, 112 Colo. 78, 145 P.2d 980 (1944).
s E.g., Lyons v. Egan, 107 Colo. 32, 108 P.2d 873 (1940).
9 Ch. 109, [1935] Colo. Sess. Laws 398.
III CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16 (Supp. 1969), formerly ch. 252, §
211, [19531 Colo. Sess. Laws 673.
11Id. § 153-12-18 (1963).
12 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 598, 246 P.2d 894, 901 (1952).
:COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 153-12-2(1) (e)-(f) (1963).
'Id. § 153-12-19. See Pinnacle Gold Mining Co. v. Propst, 54 Colo. 451,
131 P. 413 (1913).
'--See Bennet v. Reef, 16 Colo. 431, 27 P. 252 (1891). The deficit in the
widow's allowance may also be paid out of the rents of the real estate.
Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 P. 99 (1888).
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insufficiency to pay the allowance was caused by a gratuitous
conveyance by the decedent during his or her lifetime, at least
one Colorado case has held that the surviving spouse may not
complain of the conveyance since he or she has no right to
an allowance during the decedent's lifetime.'" The right to
the family allowance exists regardless of whether the decedent
left a will or whether the will was admitted to probate.'
7
Similarly, the fact that one claiming the allowance is entitled
to a distributive share of the estate has no effect upon the
right to the full family allowance.'8 The statute specifically
provides that the family allowance shall be exempt from at-
tachment, execution, and other process.' 9 The exemption bars
only the general creditors of the estate, however, and the
allowance is not beyond the 'reach of the widow's personal
creditors. 20 The surviving spouse's right to claim the family
allowance may be voluntarily and expressly waived, as in a
valid antenuptial agreement21 or separate maintenance agree-
ment, 22 but the waiver must be clear and specific. 23 Since the
right to the allowance vests upon the decedent's death, sub-
ject to timely application, the surviving spouse's remarriage
does not affect her right to the allowance.
24
B. The Homestead Exemption
If a decedent was possessed of a homestead exemption at
the time of his or her death, the surviving spouse or minor
children are entitled to the exemption. 25 At present, the statu-
tory amount of the homestead exemption is $5,000. This sum
must be paid to the surviving spouse or children from the
proceeds of any sale of homesteaded property. The homestead
exemption is in addition to the family allowance, and the
decedent's beneficiaries other than the spouse have no in-
terest in the homestead of the surviving spouse. The purpose
of the homestead law is to "preserve a right of occupancy
16 Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594, 45 P.2d 638 (1935).
1' Williams v. Pollard, 101 Colo. 262, 72 P.2d 476 (1937).
18 Id.
19 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-12-16(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
2 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 598, 246 P.2d 894, 901 (1952);
Isbell-Kent-Oakes Dry Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank & Trust
Co., 75 Colo. 451, 226 P. 293 (1924).
21 See, e.g., Maher v. Knauss, 150 Colo. 108, 370 P.2d 1017 (1962); Griffee v.
Griffee, 108 Colo. 366, 117 P.2d 823 (1941).
22 Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 266 P. 497 (1928).
23 Bradley v. Bradley, 106 Colo. 500, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940); Deeble v.
Alerton, 58 Colo. 166, 143 P. 1096 (1914).
24 See Hale v. Burford, 73 Colo. 197, 214 P. 543 (1923).
2 5
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-3-4 (1963).
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for those who stand in the relation of the head of a family."26
The surviving spouse becomes the head of the family imme-
diately upon his or her spouse's death, and therefore has a
continuing right to occupy the homesteaded property until
the amount of the homestead allowance is paid.
II. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ALLOWANCES AND EXEMPTIONS
A. The Family Allowance
The underlying premise upon which the family allowance
portion of the Code2 7 is based is that a surviving spouse should
receive a monetary support allowance "off the top" of the
decedent's estate in the year following death.2 8 Under the Code,
the family of a decedent who was domiciled in the state would
be entitled to a "reasonable" allowance for maintenance dur-
ing the period of administration. 2 The purpose of the Code's
allowance is the same as that already announced for Colo-
rado's present allowance: to provide support for the family
while the estate is undergoing administration. 30 Instead of
authorizing a uniform fixed sum to be allowed in all cases,
the Code calls for a flexible or "reasonable" amount. In each
case a number of factors, including need, would be considered
in determining the amount of the allowance. 31 Nevertheless,
the Code would impose several limitations on the amount.
First, the allowance could not exceed $500 per month or $6,000
per year unless the family member or representative of the
estate petitioned the court for a larger amount.32 In addi-
tion, since the family allowance takes preference over claims
of general creditors, the court could not continue the allowance
for longer than 1 year if the estate were inadequate to dis-
charge allowed claims.
33
Those entitled to claim the family allowance under the
Code would include the surviving spouse, minor children whom
the decedent was obligated to support, and children who were
in fact being supported by the decedent.34 Although the Gen-
21 Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 125 Colo. 584, 593, 246 P.2d 894, 898 (1952).
7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
: REPORT OF COLORADO SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARTICLE II (Intestate Succession
& Wills) OF UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1972) [hereinafter cited as the
COLORADO SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
"1' Effland, Rights of the Surviving Spouse & Children, UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.9, at 56 (1972).
34 Id.
:' CODE § 2-403.
:;2 Id. § 2-404.
3;3 Id.
;14 Id. § 2-403.
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eral Comment to Part 4 of the Code expressly provides that
the family allowance should be granted only where the de-
cedent was domiciled in the state, it does not require the
spouse to be a resident.5
If a person entitled to the family allowance dies, his right
to any future payment terminates. The family allowance is
not reduced by any amount passing by intestate succession nor
by the surviving spouse's elective share. Similarly, it would
not be charged against any bequest in the decedent's will
unless the will expressly provided otherwise.3"
B. Exempt Property
Under the Code, the exemption of the surviving spouse
or children for household goods and other personal property
is a separate provision from the family allowance provision.
Code section 2-402 would permit the surviving spouse or chil-
dren to select up to $3,500 worth of household furniture, auto-
mobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects of a de-
cedent domiciliary. This provision was designed to relieve the
personal representative of the duty to sell household chattels
when there are family members who would have them 7 The
personal representative would have the power to execute the
appropriate documents to establish ownership of the property
taken as exempt.
38
If the selected chattels were encumbered so that their
net unencumbered value is less than $3,500, or if the exempt
property in the estate does not amount to $3,500, the surviving
spouse or children would be entitled to other estate property,
including cash, to make up the $3,500 amount." On the other
hand, a claimant may be able to choose more than the $3,500
worth of property in certain circumstances. Professor Effland
of the Arizona State College of Law gives the following
example:
Suppcse that the surviving spouse wishes to select two
items of normally exempt property, houselold furnishings in
the amount of $2,000 and an automobile valued at $2,100, none
of these items having been specifically devised. The spouse
is entitled to exempt property in a value not exceeding $3,500
and the selected items exceed this by $600. However, al-
35 This appears to be in conformity with present Colorado law. At least
one commentator, however, writes that the surviving spouse must be
domiciled in the state. Effland, supra note 29, § 4.9, at 56.
36 CODE § 2-403.
37 Id. Art. II, Part 4, General Comment.
38 Id. § 2-404.
39 Id. Art. II, Part 4, General Comment.
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though the Code has no express provision for this situation,
there appears to be no reason why the spouse could not select
these items by paying to the personal representative the $600
excess. This would in effect be a selection of exempt property
in the amount of $3,500 and a sale as to the $600, the personal
representative having full power to sell under Article III of
the Code.
40
If there is no surviving spouse, all of the decedent's
children (whether or not they are minors or dependents) are
entitled to share jointly the entire exemption.4' Generally, the
right to the exempt property is one given in addition to any
property passing to the surviving spouse or children under the
decedent's will, by intestate succession, or through the elec-
tive share.42 However, by an express provision in the will, a
testator may force the spouse or children to take certain prop-
erty under the will in lieu of any exempt property.
43
C. The Homestead Allowance
Two traditional features of homestead exemptions have
been to provide property for the family prior to claims of
general creditors and at the same time to provide a portion of
the estate which could not be taken away from the family by
the decedent's will. The Code retains both of these features
in a dollar allowance called a "homestead allowance. 4 4 The
Code suggests an amount of $5,000, but the precise amount is
left to the local legislature for determination at the time the
Code is adopted. If there were no surviving spouse, the allow-
ance would be divided equally among the decedent's minor
and dependent children.45 The homestead allowance, like the
family allowance, is given in addition to any intestate share
of a spouse or child, or the elective share of the spouse. It
is also independent of any share passing under the decedent's
will, unless the will specifically provides otherwise.
D. Recommendations of the Colorado Bar Association
Subcommittee on Article II
In summation, the provisions of the Code provide three
basic protections for the immediate family. The first is a
designated homestead allowance of $5,000. The second is a $3,500
exempt property allowance which is related primarily to tan-
41 Effland, supra note 29, § 4.9, at 59.
-41 CODE § 2-402.
42 Id. § 2-403.
43 Id. § 2-206.
41 Id. § 2-401.
45 Id.
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gible personal property. The third is a family allowance of
a reasonable amount with a limit of $500 per month or $6,000
per year.
The Colorado Bar Association Subcommittee on Article II
of the Uniform Probate Code recommended the adoption of
these provisions with certain modifications. The most sub-
stantial modification was the combination of the homestead
allowance and the exempt property allowance into a single
allowance designated as an "Exempt Property Allowance" which
is not tied to any particular type of property. This eliminates
the present distinction between these two types of allowances
relating to real estate and tangible personal property. In ad-
dition, it was recommended that the amount of the Exempt
Property Allowance be increased to $10,000 to conform with
the limits of the present Small Estates Act limit in Colorado.4 "
The combination of these two allowances under the Code is
$8,500. This means that the provisions dealing with homestead
exemptions after death need to be revoked.47 The provisions
dealing with the homestead exemption during lifetime would,
of course, not require any modification. Although there was
some sentiment that a family allowance of no set sum but
merely "a reasonable allowance" was too indefinite, the con-
sensus of the subcommittee was that a flexible standard is
desirable. Unfair advantage of such a standard is limited by
the necessity for court approval if the amount is to exceed
$500 per month or $6,000 per year. The allowance may not
continue for longer than one year if the estate is inadequate
to discharge allowed claims. Payment of the family allowance
is subordinated to the payment of the exempt property allow-
ance. Rights to exempt property and the family allowance
have priority over all claims, including funeral and admin-
istration expenses.
48
III. ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. Present Colorado Law
Almost all states have some form of protection for a sur-
viving spouse against intentional disinheritance. Although some
arguments might be made against the advisability of such pro-
tection, the concept is very deeply rooted in the historical
foundations of probate law. The common law equivalent of
this probate protection was dower and curtesy.
• 4; COLORADO SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT.
47 The provisions that need to be revoked are found in CoLo. REV. STAT.




Notwithstanding the provisions of a testator's will, the
surviving spouse has the option to take one-half of the tes-
tator's estate. 4" In order to claim this elective share, the sur-
viving spouse must file a written election rejecting the pro-
visions of the will within 6 months from the date the will is
admitted to probate.5 " The failure to exercise the option within
the 6 month period is conclusive evidence of the consent of
the surviving spouse to the provisions of the will. Where an
election against the will is made, the electing spouse receives
any property which the testator specifically devised or be-
queathed to him or her plus enough additional property to
equal one-half of the aggregate value of the estate.5' All
classes of property in the estate are subject to the elective
share provisions, 52 and the interests of the beneficiaries are
abated proportionately insofar as is feasible.53 The right of
a surviving spouse to elect against the will is a personal priv-
ilege which does not pass to the spouse's heirs.54 Furthermore,
a surviving spouse's creditors may not compel him or her to
make the election.5 5 The right to elect may be voluntarily
waived before or during marriage by a valid prenuptial or
postnuptial agreement.
56
B. Problems with Existing Election Provisions
As a rule, the statutory election may be exercised only
against property which was owned by the testator at the time
of his death.5 7 This has resulted in various schemes to inten-
tionally disinherit a spouse, many of which have proved suc-
cessful. 58 For example, the decedent may have utilized various
"will substitutes" such as joint tenancy, lifetime gifts, funded
revocable trusts, and other similar nonprobate arrangements
having the effect of reducing the probate estate. Attempts to
defeat the rights of the surviving spouse can be successful
in Colorado if valid lifetime transfers or other arrangements
49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-4 (1963).
50 Id. § 153-5-4(1).
51 Id. § 153-14-10(1).
5"Logan v. Logan, 11 Colo. 44, 17 P. 99 (1888).
53' Hart v. Hart, 95 Colo. 471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934); Binkley v. Switzer, 69
Colo. 176, 192 P. 500 (1920).
34 Gallup v. Rule, 81 Colo. 335, 255 P. 463 (1927).
55 DEutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 534, 126 P. 1123 (1912).
See, e.g., Remington v. Remington, 69 Colo. 206. 193 P. 550 (1920)
(pcstnuptial agreement); Whipple v. Wessels, 66 Colo. 120, 180 P. 309
(1919) (prenuptial agreement).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-4 (1963).
:, See, e.g., Comment, Defeating the Inheritance of the Surviving Spouse,
40 Miss. L.J. 286 (1969).
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have been concluded by the decedent during his lifetime.5 9
Although some of the Colorado cases on this subject have
invalidated lifetime transfers on the basis of fraud on the sur-
viving spouse, in those cases there were equally good legal
grounds, e.g., lack of effective delivery, for invalidation of the
transfer.60 One Colorado case affirms the right of the owner
of property to convey the same without the consent or knowl-
edge of his spouse or other heir, and the mere fact that the
conveyance deprives the surviving spouse of the right to in-
herit this property does not make it fraudulent or invalid.'
This case goes quite far in preventing the surviving spouse from
reaching property transferred during the lifetime of the de-
cedent by ruling that a deed must be executed before the
grantor's death but delivery may be after the grantor's death,
even where there is a reservation of a life estate to the grantor,
provided it was the intent of the grantor at the time of execu-
tion of the deed to pass a present interest in the property
with mere postponement of the possession or enjoyment of
the property.
C. Solution of the Uniform Probate Code
Article II, Part 2 of the Code, provides for the elective
share of the surviving spouse. This is possibly the most con-
troversial provision of the entire Code. In Michigan, which
has adopted the Code, the controversy over this provision
reached the point where all statutory protection against dis-
inheritance of a spouse was completely eliminated.
62
The Code provides that, if a married person domiciled in
the state dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election
to take a share equaling one-third of the "augmented estate"
of the decedent.63 The Colorado Subcommittee has recommended
that the elective share be increased to one-half of the aug-
mented estate to conform with existing Colorado law.
6 4 It
is the concept of the augmented estate which presents the
controversy with respect to the elective share provisions. As
has been seen, it is often possible for a decedent to inten-
59 See Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 506
(1957).
60 Wolfe v. Mueller, 46 Colo. 335, 104 P. 487 (1909).
61 Thuet v. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P.2d 604 (1953).
62 This is especially surprising in view of the fact that Professor Richard
V. Wellman, Chief Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code, is a Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School and was one of the
prime movers behind the Michigan probate revision.





tionally disinherit a surviving spouse by various nonprobate
techniques. , Conversely, a surviving spouse can, under some
circumstances, receive more of the decedent's estate than might
seem equitable. For example, a surviving spouse may have been
amply provided for by the decedent through life insurance, a
living trust, outright gifts by the decedent during his life-
time, or acquisition of property in joint tenancy, and still
elect to receive a share of the probate estate. It is the purpose
of the augmented estate concept to prevent both types of in-
equity."'
The augmented estate is defined in section 2-202 of the
Code and is computed on the basis of three elements. The
beginning point is the probate estate reduced by funeral and
administration expenses, the homestead allowance, family al-
lowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims. The second
element consists of property transferred by the decedent
during marriage to persons other than the surviving spouse.
The third element consists of property which has been trans-
ferred by the decedent to the surviving spouse. The first
element is fairly easily computed. The complexities arise with
respect to the second and third elements.
The last two elements described above are added to the
first element. In other words, certain transfers by the decedent
during lifetime must be added to the net probate estate in
computing the augmented estate. Only lifetime transfers for
which the decedent did not receive adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth are to be added back
in computing the augmented estate. 7 The lifetime transfers
which are added back must come within certain defined cate-
gories. First, if the decedent makes a gratuitous transfer and
retains at the time of his death the possession or enjoyment of,
or right to income from, the property, then the property is
added to the augumented estate. Second, there are included all
properties to the extent that the decedent retained at the time
of his death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any
other person, to revoke, to consume, to invade, or to dispose
of the principal for his own benefit. Third, any property,
transferred so as to be held at the time of the decedent's
death by decedent and another with right of survivorship,
is added to the augmented estate. This would include joint
,Denver Nat'l Bank v. Von Brecht. 137 Colo. 88. 322 P.2d 667 (1958).
W; Effland, supra note 29, § 4.4, at 47.
67 CODE § 2-202(1).
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tenancy and tenancy by the entirety, but joint annuities are
specifically excluded. Finally, there is added to the augmented
estate any gratuitous transfer made by the decedent within 2
years of death, excepting gifts of $3,000 or less in each of those
years to any one donee. Contemplation of death is not a factor
with respect to such gifts, so proof of motive is immaterial.
Life insurance, accident insurance, or pensions payable to a
person other than the surviving spouse are not included in the
augmented estate. In computing the augmented estate, there
is added to the net probate estate all property falling within
any of the above categories, whether such transfers were made
to the surviving spouse or to some other person."
In computing the augmented estate against which the
election is made, we have so far discussed two basic steps.
The first of these involves computing the net probate estate
in the hands of the personal representative. The second step
involves adding to the net probate estate certain types of prop-
erty transfers made by the decedent during lifetime regard-
less of the transferee. This means that the surviving spouse
must include in the augmented estate all property which he
or she owns at the decedent's death to the extent that it is
derived from the decedent other than by will or intestate suc-
cession. The spouse must account for all such property even
though he or she may have already transferred it at the de-
cedent's death to someone else. This presents obvious problems
of tracing. Property owned by the surviving spouse at the
decedent's death or transferred by the spouse during the
decedent's lifetime is presumed to have been derived from
the decedent except to that extent that the surviving spouse
establishes that it was derived from another source." The
property owned by the surviving spouse which was derived
from the decedent is included in computing the augmented
estate, but it also reduces the amount of property which must
be contributed by others in satisfaction of the elective share
of the spouse.
As a very simple example of the operation of this com-
plicated concept, assume that we have an augmented estate
of $300,000. Let us further assume that the augmented estate
consists of a net probate estate in the amount of $100,000, plus
property having a value of $100,000 which was owned by the
decedent and the surviving spouse as joint tenants at the time
68 Id.
69 Id. § 2-202(3) (i).
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of the decedent's death, and an additional $100,000 which was
in a revocable living trust created by the decedent during
his lifetime. Suppose the decedent's will bequeaths everything
to his daughter and the living trust terminates with the re-
mainder being payable to decedent's son. Under the Colorado
Subcommittee recommendation, the surviving spouse would be
entitled to an elective share of one-half of the augmented estate
or $150,000. The surviving spouse would be required to account
for the $100,000 which she received as a surviving joint tenant.
The joint property would partially satisfy the elective share.
The next problem is the source of the additional $50,000 to
which the surviving spouse is entitled as a result of the elec-
tion. The balance of the elective share is payable out of the
remaining property of the augmented estate, without distinc-
tion between probate and nonprobate property. The liability
for the balance of the elective share is equitably apportioned
among the recipients of the augmented estate in proportion to
the value of their interests therein.4 ' This means that the son
and daughter would each be required to contribute $25,000
to the surviving spouse. Depending upon the nature of the
assets received under the will and trust, contribution by the
son and daughter should not present a serious problem since
they would have on hand the assets from which payment to
the surviving spouse could be made. Any person who is liable
for contribution may choose to give up the property received
by him or pay its value as of the time it is considered in com-
puting the augmented estate. 71 Property is valued as of the de-
cedent's death except for property given irrevocably to a donee
during the lifetime of the decedent which is valued as of the
date the donee came into possession or enjoyment of the prop-
erty.
72
A more difficult problem arises where property transferred
during the decedent's lifetime is brought back and added to
the augmented estate. The transferee is subject to contribu-
tion for his proportionate amount of the elective share even
though he may no longer own the transferred property. As-
sume a deceased parent has given his son $10,000 with which
to take a trip to Europe within 2 years of the date of death.
The son would be liable to contribute to the elective share.
A real hardship would exist if the amount of contribution
7", Id. § 2-207 (b).
7I Id. § 2-207(c).
72 Id. § 2-202 (2).
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of the son was very large and he did not have means of his
own with which to make the contribution. The tracing problem
in cases involving lifetime transfers is potentially compounded
because a donee of the transferee is liable for contribution to
the elective share to the extent the donee still has the trans-
ferred property or its proceeds at the decedent's death.
73
The right of the surviving spouse to elect may be waived
by a written contract signed after fair disclosure. This con-
templates the utilization of a prenuptial agreement or post-
nuptial agreement. In addition, any property transferred dur-
ing the lifetime of the decedent is excluded from the com-
putation of the augmented estate if it was made with the writ-
ten consent or joinder of the surviving spouse.74 This presents
a valuable estate planning tool in that it allows an individual
to assure against an election by his spouse with respect to any
specific lifetime transfer by having the spouse join in the
transfer.
The election to take the elective share is made by filing
with the court, and mailing or delivering to the personal repre-
sentative of decedent, a petition within 6 months after the
publication of notice to creditors. The Colorado Subcommittee
felt that this language in the Code is somewhat indefinite
and recommended that the petition be filed within 6 months
after the first publication of the notice to creditors.
Under the Code, the surviving spouse is permitted to re-
nounce any items that would otherwise be taken under the
decedent's will or by intestate succession and thus avoid hav-
ing to accept property specifically devised or bequeathed or
taken by operation of law. 75 This is inconsistent with present
Colorado law which provides that the court shall order the
distribution to the surviving spouse of the property specifi-
cally devised or bequeathed to him by the testator together
with such additional property as will equal one-half of the
testator's estate.76 The Colorado Subcommittee saw no com-
pelling reason to change the existing law, and recommended
changing the Code to this extent. The legislature agreed
that existing law is preferable and deleted the provision of
the Code permitting the surviving spouse to renounce any
items that would otherwise be taken under the decedent's will
or by intestate succession.
73 Id. § 2-207 (c).
74 Id.
75 Id. § 2-206 (a).
_'i COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-14-10 (1963).
VOL. 50
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
IV. OMTrED FAMILY MEMBERS
A. The Omitted Spouse
Present Colorado law provides that the subsequent mar-
riage of a testator revokes his will unless a contrary intention
is expressed in the will.77 The Code provides that a subsequent
marriage does not revoke a will, but a surviving spouse who
was not provided for in such a will is entitled to an intestate
share unless the will shows the omission to be intentional or
the testator provided for the spouse by a transfer outside the
will with the intention that such transfer be in lieu of a
testamentary provision.78 This approach is deemed preferable
to having the will revoked by the subsequent marriage, while
preserving for the surviving spouse a share of the estate. The
effect of this provision is perhaps to reduce the instances where
a spouse will claim an elective share.
B. Pretermitted Children
Under the present Colorado statute, a will is not revoked
by the subsequent birth of a child.79 However, unless it shall
appear by the terms of the will that it was the testator's in-
tention to disinherit a subsequently born child, that child is
entitled to an intestate share.80 The Code follows the same
basic rule and includes adopted children. 81 The reference to
adopted children is an extension of the Colorado law. How-
ever, a subsequently born or adopted child shall not receive
an intestate share if it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional. In addition to express omission, an intestate
share is not given where the testator had one or more children
at the time the will was executed and devised substantially
all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child. 82 Finally,
if the testator has provided for the omitted child by a trans-
fer outside the will, and if the intent that this transfer be in
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of
the testator or other evidence, then an intestate share is not
awarded.8 1 If the testator fails to provide in his will for a
living child because he believes that child to be dead, the child
receives an intestate share.84 The Code permits oral evidence
77 Id. § 153-5-3.
78 CODE § 2-301.
7
11 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-6 (Supp. 1965).
s" Id. § 153-5-6.
.14 CODE § 2-302.
. Id. § 2-302(a) (2).
.:3 Id. § 2-302(a) (3).
'4 Id. § 2-302 (b).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
to establish a testator's intent that lifetime gifts or nonprobate
transfers such as life insurance or joint accounts are in lieu
of a testamentary provision for a child born or adopted after
the will.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the Uniform Probate Code providing for
the protection of the surviving spouse and children of a de-
cedent are not different in theory from the practice which
has existed in Colorado in the past. The approach is only
slightly different with respect to the exemptions and allow-
ances. The most significant change is with respect to the elec-
tion of the surviving spouse to take against the will. Although
the provisions are very complex and possibly conducive to
much litigation, the method of ascertaining the proper elec-
tive share of the spouse is much more consistent with the
basic theory of preventing intentional disinheritance. It is not
often that elections are made against the will, but the recom-
mendations of the Code would seem to provide a more honest
solution in those cases where the election is made.
POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Colorado
Legislature enacted a modified form of the Uniform Probate
Code, which will take effect July 1, 1974. Due to two last min-
ute changes in the Code prior to final enactment, certain points
made in this article need to be clarified. First, the Code as
finally passed made the amount of the Exempt Property Allow-
ance $7,500, instead of $10,000 as was recommended by the Colo-
rado Bar Association Subcommittee on Article II of the Uniform
Probate Code. Second, it was provided that a spouse can elect
to take one-half of the augmented estate or, in the alternative,
one-half of the inventoried estate. This preserves the current
Colorado election and grants a new form of election. However,
because of this change, the form of inequity which was sought
to be eliminated by the augmented estate concept, whereby a
spouse who has been adequately provided for during the dece-
dent's lifetime may still elect to take one-half of the inven-
toried estate, still exists under the Code.
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